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FOREWORD
In November 2012, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla celebrated its 290th anniversary. Established by Peter the
Great in 1722, the Flotilla was a key component of the
Russian Empire’s expansion into the Caspian region,
and nearly 300 years later, it remains a vital element of
continued Russian influence in its “south.” The Caspian Sea and the “south” have been fundamental to
Russian security since the 18th century, when imperial Russia needed to secure and maintain trade links
with the Persian Empire, as well as prevent any further Persian encroachment. Growing rivalry between
Russia and its imperial competitors in the Caucasus
and Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries led
to frequent military clashes in the Caspian Sea, giving the Caspian Flotilla renewed military significance.
The drivers of international interest in the Caspian Sea
have changed little since the 18th century, and historical events have resonance with the contemporary situation: the competition for influence between different
regional powers; the region’s geostrategic significance, with Iran lying directly to the south; the vital
importance of economic factors; maintaining access
to natural resources, as well as lucrative trade routes;
and the influence of external actors on the development of the region.
Moscow’s concerns in the Caspian region reflect
wider concerns about growing U.S. (and European)
influence in areas traditionally perceived as Russia’s “strategic backyard,” in states such as Georgia,
Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics—concern
that is reflected in key Russian strategic documents,
including the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, 2009 National Security Strategy, and 2010 Military Doctrine. Rus-
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sian political discourse focuses on the former Soviet
space as a sphere of its exclusive influence, or, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has put it, Russia’s
“zone of privileged interest,” and Moscow has sought
to counterbalance the growing involvement of other
actors in the region. Russian policies vis-à-vis former
Soviet states in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and
its Western periphery (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) in the contemporary era are focused on maintaining influence and protecting Russia’s interests. The
“influence” narrative reflects Russia’s desire to reassert itself across the former Soviet space in order to
counter the perceived expansion of Western involvement, particularly North Atlantic Treaty Organization
enlargement, within its “sphere of influence.” Events
in Ukraine in 2014 (and Georgia in 2008) emphasize
the crucial importance of having a clear understanding of how Russia views the growing influence of external actors within its “zone of privileged interest”
and the impact on its relations with states in what is
considered to be its “near abroad.”
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines Russia’s policy toward
the Caspian Sea region as Moscow attempts to counterbalance growing American involvement within
what it perceives to be its zone of privileged interest,
focusing on the recent expansion of the Caspian Flotilla and the rationale behind it. Moscow has sought
to counterbalance the growing involvement of other
actors in the region, which has led to rising tension
between Russia and its southern neighbors. The primary objectives of the research are to examine Russian perceptions of threat and security in the Caspian
region and assess the implications for other actors.
This monograph analyzes the drivers of the increasing
competition for influence, focusing on developments
within the energy sector, and assess the implications
of Russia’s consolidation of its dominance for security and stability in the region. This issue is important
because a clear understanding of Russian strategic
thinking and threat perception in the Caspian Sea is
vital in order to facilitate effective U.S. policy in the
wider Caucasus and Central Asian region.
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RUSSIA AND THE CASPIAN SEA:
PROJECTING POWER OR COMPETING
FOR INFLUENCE?
In November 2012, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla celebrated its 290th anniversary. Established by Peter
the Great in 1722, the Flotilla was a key component
of the Russian Empire’s expansion into the Caspian
region, and nearly 300 years later, it remains a vital
element of continued Russian influence in its ”south.”
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) describes the
Caspian Flotilla as “not only the southernmost outpost of Russia, but also the guarantor of the integrity
of maritime boundaries and the most important foreign policy tool of the state in the Caspian Sea.”1 The
Flotilla has recovered from the collapse of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 and its
subsequent redeployment from Baku to Astrakhan.
Unlike other Russian fleets, it has not been reduced in
size, but has been the focus of significant investment
in recent years. By 2020, the Caspian Flotilla will have
received as many as 16 new vessels, a striking number
for a relatively small, “closed” basin with no access to
the open seas, where the littoral states control access
in and out of the region. This raises questions about
Russian perceptions of threat and security in the Caspian region: who and/or what does Russia perceive to
be such a security challenge in the area that it needs to
upgrade its naval capabilities so significantly?
The Caspian Sea is part of Russia’s “southern underbelly” (yuzhnaya podbryush”ye2), a term that underscores the sense of vulnerability Russia feels along its
southern border. Rich in resources, the broader Caspian region is also an area of ongoing border disputes,
transnational threats, and growing international
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interest. The region’s geographic location confers both
important advantages and a number of challenges:
The development of international transport and communication corridors across the Sea are undoubtedly
an advantage, although this is countered by the fact
that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are
landlocked and reliant upon other countries to export
their hydrocarbons to international markets. Furthermore, the key strategic location of the Caspian, linking Asia and Europe, and the lack of consensus among
the five littoral states about the legal status of the Sea,
facilitate the passage of security challenges such as international terrorism, illegal migration, transnational
organized crime, and trafficking from Central Asia
to Europe.
Russia traditionally has been the biggest regional
power and, despite the appearance of new actors
within the region in the wake of the breakup of the
USSR that challenged Russian hegemony, it remains
the principal economic and military power in the
Caspian region, largely a result of historical legacy.
Moscow considers the region to be a sphere of its
exclusive influence, or, as former Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev has put it, Russia’s “zone of privileged interest,” and has sought to counterbalance the
growing involvement of other actors. Thus, Russian
policies vis-à-vis the Caspian region (and the wider
former Soviet area) are focused on maintaining influence and protecting its political and economic interests in the region. Former Soviet states are generally
wary of pursuing policies that run counter to Russian
interests, limiting the ability of other actors, such as
the United States, to increase their cooperation with
these states. The region is unique in terms of Russia’s
relations with its neighbors within the wider “south,”
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as it contains three former Soviet states, none of which
is willing to remain wholly dependent on Moscow (as,
for example, Armenia is), but which have also been
unwilling to turn their backs on Russia (as Georgia
has tried to do). Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
have sought to balance their relations with Russia
against deepening cooperation with the West in order
to maintain their independence, while Turkmenistan
pursues a policy of “Positive Neutrality” in its foreign
relations. The final littoral state, Iran, is an historic rival of Russia. It considers itself to be a regional power
and has substantial historical, cultural, and ethnic
links with neighboring states in the region, inherited
from the Persian Empire, which complicate its foreign
relations. Nevertheless, although it is a rival for influence, Iran also shares a common desire with Russia to
counter the increasing presence of external powers in
region, particularly the United States.
The rise in U.S. (and European) interests in the
Caspian region over the past decade has led to rising
tension between Russia and its southern neighbors.
The United States views the Caspian as an important
strategic arena: as well as its geostrategic location,
with Iran lying directly to the south, it is a significant
source of hydrocarbons. It has become increasingly
important to the economic security of the West as
international oil companies have spent vast sums of
money on exploration and development there, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. However,
limited export options, as well as reliance upon the
Russian pipeline network and neighboring countries, have restricted the ability of countries in the
Caspian to profit fully from their extensive oil and
gas reserves. Consequently, there has been considerable investment in new international export pipelines
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over the past decade, undermining Russian influence.
Some Russian observers have described the issue of
pipelines in the landlocked Caspian region as a “battle
for domination,” particularly on the part of the United
States, which “is seeking to accelerate the process of
the political and economic isolation of former Soviet
republics from Russia.”3 While this view ascribes little autonomy of action to the states involved, it does
highlight the suspicion with which Moscow regards
growing Western (particularly U.S.) influence in the
Caspian region.4
The Caspian Sea has also been playing a vital role
in the logistics operation to support the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. It
forms part of the southern route of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which was established in
2009 to move troop supplies into Afghanistan, avoiding the hazardous route through Pakistan. By 2011, the
NDN handled about 40 percent of Afghanistan-bound
traffic, compared to 30 percent through Pakistan. The
southern route starts at the Georgian Black Sea port
of Poti, crossing the Caucasus to Baku in Azerbaijan,
where goods are then ferried across the Caspian Sea to
Kazakhstan and then moved by rail or truck through
Uzbekistan to the Afghan border. This route carries
approximately one-third of the NDN’s traffic. Kazakhstan has been seeking to develop its port of Aqtau on
the Caspian Sea and turn it into a major regional transit hub. As the country’s only seaport and described
as the “sea-gate to a sovereign Kazakhstan,”5 Aqtau
has played a key role in the ISAF logistics chain and
is set to grow in importance as the United States and
other ISAF contributors withdraw from Afghanistan
in 2014. Reports in the Russian media suggested that
the United States may establish a transhipment point
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at Aqtau, as a means of getting its military equipment
out of Afghanistan and highlighted Russian opposition to the presence of any external actors in the closed
system of the Caspian Sea. An article in Nezavisimaya
Gazeta argued that, if Aqtau became a base for “the
Pentagon and its allies,” the “already fragile Caspian
security architecture would effectively collapse.”6
Moscow has tolerated limited U.S. military support
for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in terms of training
and equipment support through the Caspian Guard
initiative. However, the prospect of the potential establishment of a transhipment base at Aqtau appears
to be a step too far for Russia (and Iran) and could lead
to growth in tension in the area.
This monograph examines Russia’s policy toward
the Caspian Sea region as Moscow attempts to counterbalance growing American involvement within
what it perceives to be its zone of privileged interest,
focusing on the recent expansion of the Caspian Flotilla and the rationale behind it. The primary objectives
of the research are to analyze Russian perceptions of
threat and security in the Caspian region and assess
the implications for other actors. It will assess the importance of the “south” to Russian perceptions of security and analyze whether U.S./Western influence in
the Caspian region is viewed as a security challenge
by Moscow. What steps have been taken since 1991
to develop any form of regional security system and
what has been Russia’s role in this? The monograph
focuses on developments within the energy sector and
assesses the implications of Russia’s consolidation of
its dominance for energy security and stability in the
region. This issue is important because a clear understanding of Russian strategic thinking and threat perception in the Caspian Sea is vital in order to facilitate
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effective U.S. policy in the region and avoid a repeat
of the events of 2008 in Georgia.
THE CASPIAN SEA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
According to some sources, over the centuries the
Caspian Sea has been known by more than 50 different
names.7 At various times, the ancient Persians called
it the Hyrcanian and Persian Sea, while old Russian
documents refer to it as the Khvalin Sea, after the Khvali people that inhabited the area. Other names given
to the Sea have included Avar, Baku, Apsheron, and
Khazar. The name “Caspian” is thought to be derived
from the name of an ancient tribe that lived on the
southwest shore of the Sea, the Caspi people.8 Russian
interest in the Caspian began in earnest during the
17th century with the development of trade links with
Persia, which led to an expansion of shipping routes
along the Volga river and down across the Caspian
Sea. The growing Russian empire needed the abundant natural resources found in and around the Sea,
as well as the trade links between east and west and
routes across the Caspian. This stimulated the need
for the development of a Russian naval capability to
protect its commercial interests in the region, and Tsar
Alexis I ordered the construction of naval ships. The
Oryel was the first Russian warship to be constructed;
it set sail for Astrakhan in 1669, under the command
of Dutch captain David Butler.9
During the 18th century Russia sought to dominate the area, leading to the development of its own
Caspian naval flotilla. Established by Peter the Great
in 1722, the flotilla was a key component of the Russian Empire’s expansion in the Caspian region. Russia
was becoming increasingly concerned about growing
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rivalry with both the Ottoman and Persian Empires in
the southwest Caspian and Caucasus.10 As the empire
grew, it had come into conflict with the other imperial
powers in the region, the Ottomans and Persians. The
competition for territory and resources in the 18th and
19th centuries led to frequent military clashes on the
Caspian Sea, giving the Caspian Flotilla renewed military significance. Moscow was determined to maintain its lucrative trade routes and defend its allies in
the region, a state of affairs that has resonance with
the contemporary situation.
There are significant similarities between historical
events and contemporary circumstances in the region,
and the drivers of international interest in the Caspian Sea have changed little since the 18th century: the
competition for influence between different regional
powers, the region’s geostrategic significance, with
Iran lying directly to the south; the vital importance of
economic factors and maintaining access to natural resources; as well as lucrative trade routes and concern
about the influence of external actors on the development of the region. Over the past decade, the region
has grown in further significance within the contemporary security environment, particularly its political, strategic, and economic importance for Western
security. International oil companies have spent vast
sums of money on exploration and development in
the wider Caspian region, and the Sea has become an
important transit route for the ISAF logistics operation. Rich in resources and lying on a key East-West
transit route, the Caspian has attracted considerable
international (particularly U.S.) interest over the past
decade, triggering rising tension between Russia and
its southern neighbors. Russia traditionally has been
the biggest regional power, and its ties to the region
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remain strong. Moscow considers the broader Caspian region to be a sphere of its exclusive influence,
and it is unhappy about the growing influence of other external actors such as the United States, Europe,
Turkey, and Iran, which, since 1991, has posed a direct
challenge to Russian hegemony in the region.
The Caspian Sea is also where imperial Russia began to develop naval vessels for the purpose of defending its national and commercial interests during
the 17th and 18th centuries, leading to the development of a navy. Russia’s current maritime doctrine, approved in 2001 and looking out to 2020, describes the
navy as an “instrument of foreign policy . . . intended
to protect the interests of the Russian Federation and
its allies.”11 It goes on to describe Russia as “historically . . . a leading maritime power,” a consequence
of the country’s “spatial and geophysical attributes,”
and identifies the Caspian as a unique region in terms
of the “volume and quantity” of its mineral and bioresources. This is reflected in the role of the Caspian
Flotilla which, in addition to protecting Russian shipping, also provides protection to Russian offshore
hydrocarbon production facilities against potential
threats and monitors the extraction of hydrocarbons
and bio-resources (such as sturgeon) in disputed areas
of the Sea. The objectives of Russian maritime policy
in the Caspian Sea region are:
•	The establishment of a legal regime in the Caspian Sea that is favorable for Russia in terms
of exploiting resources such as fish stocks and
hydrocarbons;
•	Protecting the marine environment in cooperation with the other littoral states;
•	Creating the conditions for basing and utilization of all naval/maritime potential;
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•	Renewal of merchant, combined (river-sea) and
fishing fleets;
•	Preventing displacement of Russian fleet from
maritime transport market;
•	Organization of ferry services as part of “intermodal” transport network with access to the
Mediterranean and Baltic Seas; and,
•	
Development, reconstruction, and specialization of existing ports.12
This monograph uses these maritime policy objectives, particularly the first three, as a framework
to analyze the significance of the Caspian Sea region
for Russia and further understand the motivations
for the expansion and capability upgrade of the Caspian Flotilla. It begins with an appraisal of the Sea’s
resources, both hydrocarbons and sturgeon, before
examining cooperation and obstacles to cooperation
between the littoral states, the importance of the Sea
for Russian security, and the development of naval
capabilities there.
CASPIAN RESOURCES
Oil and Gas Reserves.
The Caspian Sea was the site of the world’s first
commercial oil industry, with the development of oil
reserves in Azerbaijan (then part of the Russian Empire) at the end of the 19th century. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caspian region
was heralded as the Middle East of the future because
of its potential hydrocarbon reserves. However, the
euphoria and optimism that accompanied the initial
involvement of foreign investors in the region has
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been tempered by difficult operating conditions, both
political and geological. Although the Caspian has
been lauded as the new Middle East, current proven
reserves indicate a greater similarity with the North
Sea than with the Persian Gulf (see Table 1).
Proven Oil
Reserves
(Billion
Barrels)
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Saudi Arabia
Iran

7.0
30.0
87.2
0.6
265.9
157

Share of
Global
Total
Percent

Reserve-toProduction
(R/P) Ratio

0.4
1.8
5.2
15.9
9.4

21.9
47.4
22.4
7.4
63
-

Proven Gas
Reserves
(Trillion
Cubic
Meters)
0.9
1.3
32.9
17.5
8.2
33.6

Share of
Global
Total
Percent
0.5
0.7
17.6
9.3
4.4
18.0

Table 1. Comparison of Proved Reserves
in the Caspian and Middle East, 2012.13
The North and South Caspian Basins are very different. The North is comprised of shallow waters, which
are ice-bound during the winter months, presenting
a serious technical challenge for energy companies.
It is also the location of sturgeon breeding grounds.
The South is deeper, but is not thought to contain as
much oil and is possibly more gas-prone. Exploratory
drilling in the South Caspian Basin has significantly
reduced estimates of future oil potential and foreign
companies have begun to adopt a more moderate attitude toward the development of the Caspian’s hydrocarbon reserves. In terms of hydrocarbon resources,
oil reserves are predominantly concentrated in Western Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, with large natural gas reserves found in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Kazakhstan.
10

R/P
Ratio
57.1
65.6
55.6
80.1
-

Kazakhstan, where oil was first discovered over
100 years ago, has the largest recoverable reserves of
oil in the Caspian Sea region. According to British Petroleum’s (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy, published in 2013, the country has proven oil reserves of
30 billion barrels and was producing 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2012, making it a major producer.
Kazakhstan’s proven natural gas reserves stood at
1.3 Trillion cubic meters (Tcm) in 2012, the majority
of which are located in the west of the country. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA),
around 80 percent of the country’s total natural gas
reserves are found in just four fields: Karachaganak,
Tengiz, Imashevskoye, and Kashagan.
Oil is located primarily in the west of the country,
both on- and offshore. Current production is dominated by two giant onshore fields, Tengiz and Karachaganak, which together produced over 40 percent
of the country’s total output in 2013.14 Tengiz is Kazakhstan’s largest field, with daily production of over
500,000 bpd. It is operated by Tengizchevroil (TCO),
a joint venture that includes major U.S. oil companies
Chevron and ExxonMobil, together with KazMunaiGaz and LukArco.15 Karachaganak accounted for
around 12 percent of the total oil production in 2013.
Its operator, Karachaganak Petroleum Operating
(KPO), includes BG, ENI, Chevron and LUKoil.16
It is estimated that two-thirds of future oil production will be from the North Caspian Basin, predominantly from the giant offshore Kashagan field being
developed by the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC) consortium, comprising KazMunaiGaz,
Shell, ENI, ExxonMobil, Total, Inpex, and the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Kashagan is thought to be one of the largest known fields
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outside of the Middle East and has been described
as the “world’s largest oil discovery in 5 decades.”17
It is hoped that it will provide a reliable indicator of
the Caspian’s potential oil supply: exploratory drilling has indicated that the field holds up to 35 billion
barrels of oil, of which approximately 25 percent (7-9
billion barrels) can be produced. Production has been
delayed several times, largely because of extreme operating conditions. The first production is expected in
the spring of 2014, with production being increased
from 180,000 bpd during the first phase to as much
as 370,000 bpd in the second. Located in shallow waters that freeze in winter, damaging equipment and
making maintenance difficult, the field also produces
toxic hydrogen sulphide. A gas leak in October 2013
led to a further halt in operations and raised concerns
about potential environmental damage. The development of Kazakhstan’s “superfields” is key to the country’s long-term economic growth, and Kashagan in
particular is vital for the country to achieve its goal of
increasing crude oil output by 60 percent by the end
of the decade. Kashagan is the only offshore “superfield” and therefore the only one currently with direct
relevance to the Caspian Sea.
In September 2013, China’s CNPC acquired an 8.33
percent stake in the Kashagan consortium for U.S.$5
billion.18 The purchase was part of a series of deals
signed by Chinese President Xi Jingping19 during a
tour of Central Asia to secure access to the region’s
hydrocarbons and was symbolic of the increasing
Chinese presence in the region. The deal was also indicative of the competition for influence occurring in
the region, particularly over access to hydrocarbons:
CNPC beat its Indian rival Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) to the stake, which was held by U.S.
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major oil company, ConocoPhillips, until July 2013.
Kazakhstan’s extensive hydrocarbon reserves have
stimulated a lot of international interest and increased
the presence of external actors in the Caspian region,
undermining Russian influence. While the country
has so far managed to balance successfully its relations
with Moscow, the West, and Beijing, their conflicting
interests and notions of security could undermine
stability in the medium to long term, and Kazakhstan will need to develop its naval forces to be able
to demonstrate its intent to protect its interests in the
Caspian Sea.
Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea also contains
significant hydrocarbon reserves, although there are
indications that it may be more gas- than oil-prone. Recent exploration in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea
has been disappointing, with the exception of the BPled Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) superstructure, and
several wells have been plugged. Azerbaijan’s proven
crude oil reserves were estimated at 7 billion barrels
in 2012 (see Table 1). The country’s largest hydrocarbon basins are located offshore, with the majority of
its oil currently being produced from the ACG fields.
The U.S.$8 billion deal, which established the BPled Azerbaijan International Operating Corporation
to develop the Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli offshore
fields, was concluded in 1994. Dubbed the “contract
of the century,” it was the Azeri government’s first international oil agreement with a consortium of global
oil companies and marked Azerbaijan’s entrance onto
the international energy market. The ACG concession
is the largest international project in Azerbaijan and
comprises three fields with total reserves estimated
to be at least 5.4 billion barrels of recoverable oil.20
Azerbaijan’s total oil production was expected to
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peak by 2012, and recent data suggests that production has been declining over the past couple of years
(see Table 2).

Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Saudi Arabia
Iran

Oil
Production
(barrels per
day)
872,000
1,728,000
10,643,000
222,000
11,530,000
3,680,000

Yearon-Year
Change
Percent
-5.2
-1.6
+1.2
+2.5
+3.7
-16.2

Share of
Global
Total
Percent
1.1
2.0
12.8
0.3
13.3
4.2

Gas
Production
(Billion cubic
meters)
15.6
19.7
592.3
64.4
102.8
160.5

Yearon-Year
Change
Percent
+5.1
+2.0
-2.7
+7.8
+11.1
+5.4

Table 2. Comparison of Oil and
Gas Production in the
Caspian and Middle East, 2012.21
The ACG fields also produce a significant quantity
of natural gas. In 2012, Azerbaijan’s natural gas reserves were estimated at 0.9 Tcm and, like its oil, most
of Azerbaijan’s natural gas is produced from a few
fields in the Caspian: ACG and Shah Deniz. Situated
in the Caspian Sea around 60 miles southeast of Baku,
the field’s operator BP claims that Shah Deniz is one of
the world’s largest gas-condensate fields with over 1
Tcm of gas. Stage One of the field’s development began
operations in 2006, with an annual production capacity of 9 Billion cubic meters (Bcm).22 Shah Deniz is significant because it is the only major field development
in the Caspian Sea focused primarily on natural gas,
rather than oil, despite the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the region is likely to be more gas- than oil-prone.
With the exception of Shah Deniz, foreign investment
in Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon sector (and across the
Caspian) has centered on oil projects, which require
14

Share of
Global
Total
Percent
0.5
0.6
17.6
1.9
3.0
4.8

less capital expenditure than natural gas projects, and
less investment in infrastructure to get them started.
Oil is also a more tradeable commodity than natural
gas, which generally requires supply agreements to be
in place before production begins.
Turkmenistan possesses some of the world’s largest reserves of natural gas, as well as significant reserves of oil, although its ability to profit from these
extensive hydrocarbon reserves has been restricted. In
2012 it had proven gas reserves of 17.5 Tcm, over 9
percent of total global reserves of natural gas, most of
which is located onshore, in the east of the country;
there is little in the Caspian Sea. While an independent audit of Turkmenistan’s South Yolotan-Osman
field in 2008 revealed huge quantities of natural gas,
suggesting that the field may be one of the five largest in the world, in 2009 the Turkmen president dismissed the heads of several key gas departments for
“falsification” of the data on natural gas reserves.23
According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy,
in 2012 Turkmenistan had proven oil reserves of 0.6
billion barrels, the majority of which are located in
the South Caspian Basin and onshore in the west of
the country.24 It also claims to have significant oil reserves in areas of the Caspian Sea that are subject to a
dispute with Azerbaijan over ownership, notably the
Serdar field (called Kyapaz by Azerbaijan), which lies
on the maritime border between the two countries and
has estimated recoverable reserves of 370-700 million
barrels. Despite Turkmenistan seeking international
arbitration to settle the boundary dispute, this issue,
alongside Turkmenistan’s claims to portions of the
Azeri and Chirag fields (called Khazar and Osman by
Turkmenistan) being developed by Azerbaijan, are
still unresolved.
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Russian production of oil and gas in the Caspian is
limited: although it is thought that Russia may have
estimated hydrocarbon reserves of up to 32 billion barrels of oil equivalent in its sector of the Caspian Sea,
exploration has been limited to date. Between 1999
and 2005, the major Russian oil company, LUKoil,
discovered six oil and gas fields in the northern sector of the Caspian, with total estimated reserves of 4.7
billion barrels. In 2010, the company began developing the Yury Korchagin offshore field, which holds an
estimated 270 million barrels of oil and over 63 Bcm of
natural gas.25 It is important to note that the statistics
in Table 1 for Russia include the whole of the country,
not just its reserves in its sector of the Caspian Sea.
Potential hydrocarbon reserves in the Iranian sector of the Caspian remain largely unexplored, and
there is no significant Iranian production in the Sea.
According to the National Iranian Oil Company, the
country’s Sardar Jangal field in the Caspian contains
significant reserves worth over U.S.$50 billion.26 Iran
announced at the end of 2011 that it had discovered the
field, which it claims holds at least 1.4 Tcm of natural
gas and as much as 100 million barrels of oil.27 Despite
these optimistic announcements, Iranian exploration
and production in the Caspian is very limited, largely
because its national sector of the Sea is very deepwater
and therefore difficult to explore with its current technologies. U.S. and European sanctions have restricted
the involvement of international oil majors in the
country and, consequently, Iran’s access to the most
up-to-date production technologies. Furthermore, the
Caspian Sea is not as important for Iran as it is for
some of the other littoral states: Iran has reserves elsewhere that are much easier and cheaper to produce
and transport to international markets. However, Iran
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is unlikely to commit to any common agreement on
the Caspian Sea’s legal status (discussed later) until it
has fully explored its national sector, and thus, it will
continue to be a spoiler in the Caspian region, blocking any prospective collective settlement.
Pipelines.
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have
considerable hydrocarbon reserves and hope to become major players on the world energy market. However, even if they increase the production of hydrocarbons, they still face several enduring obstacles: the
difficulty of transporting products from the remote,
landlocked Caspian region to lucrative international
markets, together with the unclarified legal status of
the Sea. Export infrastructure from the Caspian Sea
region is still insufficient, and the development of additional export capacity is vital for future production
growth. Limited export options, as well as reliance
upon the Russian pipeline network and neighboring
countries, have so far served to restrict the ability of
the Caspian littoral countries to profit from their extensive oil and gas reserves. During the Soviet era, the
routing of pipeline infrastructure was not a prominent
issue for oil-producing areas of the USSR—pipelines
were constructed to serve the needs of the Union, and
thus, republics such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
were part of the national network, which generally
flowed towards western Russia and Moscow. However, independence meant that the question of how
to get oil and gas out of a relatively isolated area to
international markets rose progressively to the top of
the agenda for producers in the Caspian region. Until a decade ago, countries in the region were reliant
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upon the Russian network of pipelines to reach European consumers, undermining their political and
economic autonomy and giving Moscow substantial
leverage. In 1997 Azeri President Heydar Aliyev announced that his country was “no longer prepared to
be totally dependent upon Moscow” for the transit of
its oil.28 Consequently, there has been considerable investment in new international export pipelines over
the past decade, which has led to the development of a
southern oil and gas corridor between the Caspian and
Mediterranean Seas and brought significant economic
and security benefits. Pipelines have a permanency
and an impact on political relations that highlight the
strategic significance of hydrocarbons in the contemporary era. The static network of pipelines currently
supplying Europe reflects the geopolitical situation
of the Cold War, while new links demonstrate the
geopolitical shift.
The focus to date has been on oil export infrastructure, symbolized by the ambitious Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) project, a vital element in expanding oil
production in the Caspian Basin.29 The BTC (and BTE/
South Caucasus [SCP] gas) pipeline has considerable
symbolic significance, providing a direct link between
the Caspian region and Europe. Its construction has
significantly altered the balance of power in the region,
strengthening the political and economic autonomy
of states such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, reducing
Russian influence and cementing the involvement of
Western actors such as Europe and the United States.
Nevertheless, producers on the eastern side of the
Caspian, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan still remain
largely reliant on the Russian pipeline network to get
their hydrocarbons to Western markets.30
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Kazakhstan has been seeking to keep its options
open in terms of export routes. The Kazakhstan-China
pipeline, which shipped its first oil in 2009, is a symbol of Beijing’s strengthening ties with Central Asia
(and China’s first international oil pipeline), although
all pipeline routes that run out of Kazakhstan toward
the West cross Russian territory. Most Kazakh oil is
exported via the Russian (and Chinese) pipeline network, including being shipped across the Caspian to
terminals at Makhachkala and Taman and then on to
the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisyk. Kazakhstan had been exporting Kazakh oil to international
markets through the BTC, following a bilateral agreement with Azerbaijan in 2006. From 2008 to 2010, Kazakh oil transit via the BTC pipeline totaled 2.2 million tons, although Kazakhstan then switched to other
export routes after disagreement over the conditions
of shipment. It was reported at the end of 2013 that
Kazakh oil would again be transported via the BTC:
Tengizchevroil, the operator of the Tengiz field, announced it would be exporting 400,000 tons per month
via the pipeline, shipping the oil across the Caspian
by tanker.31 The agreement also included provision
for an increase in Kazakh oil shipments via the BTC
to around 20 percent of the pipeline’s throughput capacity by 2018-20, once production at the Kashagan
field moves into its second phase. It is expected that
Kazakhstan’s oil exports will double once Kashagan is
fully productive, necessitating a significant expansion
of export infrastructure capacity, including greater
use of the BTC and cross-Caspian tanker routes.
Kazakhstan has signed a memorandum with
Azerbaijan on the development of a Kazakh Caspian
Transportation System (KCTS), although progress has
been slow. The agreement between KazMunaiGaz
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and SOCAR (the national oil companies of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), signed with the operators of the
Kashagan and Tengiz fields, was intended to develop
oil shipment routes to deliver crude from these two
fields to the BTC and onward to international markets.32 The KCTS is an integrated system consisting of
a pipeline to transport crude from Eskene and Tengiz to an oil terminal in Kuryk on the Kazakh coast
of the Caspian Sea, tankers and vessels to transport
crude across the Caspian, an oil discharge terminal
on the Azerbaijani coast, and connecting facilities to
the BTC. The original agreement envisaged the project being operational by 2013-14, initially transporting
up to 23 million tons of crude per year, increasing to
36 million tons. However, in 2010, KazMunaiGaz announced that implementation of the KCTS was being
postponed because of delays on the Kashagan project, which is not expected to get underway until 2014
at the earliest.33 Nevertheless, Kazakhstan still ships
crude oil across the Caspian and exports it via Azerbaijan, as discussed previously. Azerbaijan’s Energy
Ministry expects around four million tons of Kazakh
oil to be transported via Azeri territory in 2014.34
The three major littoral producers of oil and gas—
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—need to
develop their maritime capabilities in order to be able
to protect their interests in the Caspian Sea, including
unexplored fields, production installations, and transport infrastructure such as tankers. Russia already
dominates energy export infrastructure, giving it an
undue amount of influence, and its investment in the
Caspian Flotilla (whose roles include monitoring the
extraction of hydrocarbons in disputed areas of the
Sea) suggests a desire to maintain and possibly expand
this influence. Some Russian observers have described
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the issue of pipelines in the landlocked Caspian region as a “battle for domination,” particularly on the
part of the United States, which “is seeking to accelerate the process of the political and economic isolation
of former Soviet republics from Russia.”35 While this
view ascribes little autonomy of action to the states
involved, it does highlight the suspicion with which
Moscow regards growing Western (particularly U.S.)
influence in the Caspian region. Russian successes,
such as the subsea Blue Stream gas pipeline, are considered to be the result of the “failure of American
pipeline strategy in the Caucasus and Central Asia as
a whole.”36 A major division has opened up between
supporters of Russian and non-Russian export routes,
which has the potential to produce new dividing lines
in an already unstable region. In March 2008, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had scathing remarks
about European plans for a Southern Corridor to
transport energy from the Caspian region, describing
the proposal for the multibillion-dollar, 3,900 kilometer (km) Nabucco pipeline linking Turkey and Austria as an “obviously artificial project.” He stated that
Russia has:
answers that are economically more effective, and we
are going to realise them. Blue Stream is already operational. The Caspian gas pipeline, expansion of the
Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline, Burgas-Alexandroupolis, Nord Stream and South Stream: all these rest on
a rational economic base.37

The decision to drop the Nabucco pipeline in favor of the more economically viable Trans-Adriatic
(TAP)/Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) pipeline project
suggests there was an element of truth in Lavrov’s
words. Nabucco was driven by political, rather than
21

commercial, considerations, but the European Union
(EU) appeared determined to drive it forward. The
BTC was a triumph of politics over commercial sense;
thus the precedent had been set. However, ultimately,
shifts in the European gas market meant that Nabucco
lost its strategic advantage, and the decision to abandon it was made on a commercial, not political, basis.
The U.S.$7 billion, 2,000-km TANAP pipeline will initially transport up to 16 Bcm of gas (expected to reach
31 Bcm by 2023) from Azerbaijan to Turkey, where it
will connect with the TAP, which links Turkey to Italy
via Greece and Albania. The first gas flow is expected
in 2018. These pipelines will be part of the Southern
Gas Corridor, which will encompass planned infrastructure projects to transport natural gas from the
Caspian and Middle East to European markets, in
addition to existing supply corridors from Russia, Africa, and the North Sea. In its second Strategic Energy
Review, released at the end of 2008, the European Commission (EC) called for the development of a Southern
Gas Corridor to be recognized as an energy security
priority for the EU, reducing European dependence
on Russia as a supplier of oil and gas.38
The proposed Trans-Caspian Gas (TKG) Pipeline
is a further element of the Southern Corridor, but, until recently, the project had been on the back burner.
In 2011, Medvedev warned that construction of the
pipeline, planned by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
and supported by the EU, is unacceptable until all five
littoral states have reached agreement over the legal
status of the Sea, an issue that has remained unresolved since the collapse of the USSR. Nevertheless,
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have declared that the
TKG will cross the Caspian within their own national
sectors and therefore the other littoral states have no
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say. In November 2013, the EU made it clear that it
was intent on pushing ahead with the project, despite
Russian unease. Denis Daniilidis, head of the EU mission in Turkmenistan, said that conditions were “most
favourable” for the construction of the pipeline, and
that the EU and Turkmenistan were in the final stages
of their negotiations.39 The 300-km pipeline will cross
the Caspian from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, where
it will feed into the South Caucasus country’s existing
gas export infrastructure. It will enable Turkmen gas
to reach European consumers without having to transit through the Russian pipeline network. However,
this will mean a reduction in transit tariffs for Moscow,
which, as mentioned previously, is unhappy that the
project may begin before final agreement between the
Caspian Five on the Sea’s legal status. Igor Bratchikov,
the Russian president’s special envoy for the delimitation and demarcation of borders with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), warned of the potential “catastrophic” impact the pipeline could have
on the Caspian’s “extremely sensitive ecosystem,” stating that in the event of an incident it would not be the
Europeans (or Americans), but the littoral states who
would have to tackle the aftermath.40 While potential
environmental damage is clearly a concern, Russia is
using these instrumentally to mask its real concerns,
namely, the loss of influence and transit tariffs that will
result from the construction of the TKG. Mikhail Aleksandrov from Moscow’s Institute of CIS countries has
warned that “the West is underestimating Moscow’s
resolve to resort to force in order to prevent the realisation of pipeline projects across the Caspian Sea.”41 It
is very unlikely that Moscow will resort to the use of
force to prevent the construction of the TKG, although
it is likely to continue to voice its opposition and use
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its influence to “persuade” Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to abandon the project. Russia has watched its influence over pipelines and export infrastructure in the
Caspian Basin erode over the past decade, which has
had both an economic and political impact: Moscow
has lost out on revenue from transit tariffs, but has
also seen its political dominance undermined. The upgrade of the Caspian Flotilla is a strong signal that it
is unwilling to cede any further influence and intends
to remain the predominant power in the Caspian
Sea region.
Cooperating for Caviar?
In addition to its significant hydrocarbon reserves,
the Caspian contains another high-value natural resource: it is home to five of the most valuable species
of sturgeon, which produce caviar. According to scientists from the Caspian Sea Fish Scientific-Research
Institute, the commercial value of the Sea’s biological
wealth, if properly managed, amounts to 1.1 trillion
rubles (U.S.$37 billion), equivalent to the total market value of the Sea’s recoverable reserves of oil and
gas.42 This makes them highly sought after, by legal
and illegal means, and illegal poaching of sturgeon is
a serious problem for the littoral states. Poaching and
uncontrolled fishing have had a dramatic impact on
the Caspian’s sturgeon population since the collapse
of the Soviet Union: stocks of beluga sturgeon in the
Sea have fallen by 30-40 percent over the past decade,
and some species of the fish are on the verge of extinction.43 According to the Iranian International Scientific
Research Institute, at the current rate of decline, wild
sturgeon may be extinct by 2021.44
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Reflecting the lack of consensus about the Caspian’s legal regime, the five littoral states have yet
to reach agreement on the best way to manage the
remaining sturgeon stocks. Russia introduced a ban
on the commercial fishing of sturgeon in 2002 and a
complete ban on all fishing in 2007, although there
is an exemption for scientific research. The only legally available caviar in Russia currently comes from
farmed (not wild) sturgeon. In 2012, head of Russia’s
Federal Fisheries Agency Andrei Krainy said that
the ban on fishing may be lifted if the other four littoral states agreed to a 5-year moratorium to enable
sturgeon stocks to recover.45 Kazakhstan has banned
sturgeon fishing in its sector of the Caspian. However,
although the five littoral states formally agreed on an
institutional mechanism and common environmental
policy in the sea under the Framework Convention for
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian
Sea signed in Tehran in 2006, the first legally binding
regional agreement, they have yet to fully implement
it or reach any common agreement on fishing quotas
or a moratorium on fishing. Azerbaijan and Iran support a ban, but Turkmenistan does not.
As mentioned previously, poaching is a serious
problem. Russia’s Border Guards service said it seized
seven tons of illegally caught sturgeon in 2011. In the
first 10 days of a joint month-long operation conducted by Russian and Kazakh border guards in October
2013, over 17 km of net was seized, along with 10,000
fish hooks.46 At the end of November 2013, Kazakh
border guards killed a suspected Russian poacher
during an anti-poaching operation in the Caspian. According to reports, eight small boats refused to stop
for inspection, forcing the border guards to open fire.47
The high value of the sturgeon and their caviar mean
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that poachers are willing to take greater risks to protect their income. According to one report, “80 percent
of the poachers are now armed with small arms and
grenades; the more sophisticated are even using space
tracking systems to locate the exact position of the
shoals,” prompting Vladimir Putin to describe their
activities as not just poaching, but “bioterrorism.”48
Given the high value of the sturgeon and the scale of
illegal fishing and poaching, it is not surprising that
the littoral states are investing in smaller, faster naval
vessels in an attempt to interdict illegal activities and
protect their national interests.
THE UNCLARIFIED LEGAL STATUS
OF THE CASPIAN
The unclarified legal status of the Caspian Sea remains a serious impediment to the development of
the region’s natural resources (including sturgeon and
hydrocarbon reserves) and the establishment of a stable security environment. It also facilitates illegal fishing and poaching. During the Soviet era, there were
only two states bordering the Caspian Sea: the USSR
and Iran. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 saw the appearance of four new states in its place—Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—all of whom
had access to the Sea’s valuable natural resources. The
legal status of the Caspian Sea was thrown into doubt,
and a dispute has been simmering since 1991. Ongoing negotiations between the Caspian Five have so far
failed to establish whether the Caspian is legally considered to be a lake or inland sea. This lack of agreement means that the area remains one of political dispute that has, at times, threatened to turn into military
action. In addition to the lack of clarity over the Sea’s
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legal status and whether it is a sea or a lake, there is
also disagreement among the littoral states over how
to demarcate the Sea and what legal regime to apply
(for example, median line or condominium).
Russia’s position has shifted since 1991: Initially it
supported the condominium approach, which would
entail an equal division of the Sea among the five littoral states (giving them 20 percent each) and common
sovereignty of its resources, without dividing it up
into national zones. It was opposed to any unilateral
action by the littoral states with regard to development
of the Sea’s resources and was furious when Azerbaijan announced its so-called “contract of the century”
with international oil companies in 1994. However, by
1998, following the discovery of hydrocarbons in its
sector of the Sea, the Russian government had moved
to support a median-line approach, giving each state
a share proportional to the length of its Caspian coastline. The year represented a turning point for the division of the Caspian. Viktor Kaluzhny, then Russia’s
Minister for Oil and Gas, stated that “[w]e will divide
the seabed or, more precisely, the resources of the seabed. The water is common to all, it has no borders.”49
The lack of progress toward consensus among all five
states stimulated bilateral negotiations between the
three northern states. In 2002, Russia and Kazakhstan
agreed to share the northern section of the Caspian
seabed and established an official line demarcating the
two national zones. Under the agreement, each country will exploit half of the three oil and gas fields in the
disputed area, Kurmangazy, Tsentralnoye, and Khvalinskoye. In 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan
divided the northern 64 percent of the Caspian seabed
into three unequal parts, using a median-line principle, giving Kazakhstan 27 percent; Russia, 19 percent;
and Azerbaijan, 18 percent.
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Iran believes that the status of the Caspian Sea
should be resolved on the basis of consensus between
the five littoral states and has rejected bi- and trilateral deals struck between Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Azerbaijan. It supports the “condominium” concept
and equal division of the Sea among the five littoral
states. The Iranian government has also consistently
insisted that the 1921 and 1940 agreements between
the USSR and Tehran are to remain legally binding.
This has put it in conflict with Azerbaijan, which is
calling for the Law of the Sea (and thus a median-line
principle) to be applied (under which Iran would get
14 percent) and has also continued to sign exploration agreements with oil companies despite the lack of
consensus among the littoral states.
Iran wants a suspension of all oil and gas activity
in disputed areas until an agreement has been reached
on the division of the Caspian. Confrontation erupted
in July 2001, when an Iranian warship threatened a
geological survey ship in Azerbaijan’s territorial waters. The ship was surveying the Alov-Sharg-Araz
contract area (known as Alborz to the Iranians) for
BP. The Iranian action was prompted by BP’s plans to
drill an exploration well at the Alov field in 2002 in the
absence of a multilateral agreement on the Sea’s legal
status. The Azeri government claims that the disputed sector is located above the Astara-Gasankuli line,
which links residential areas on the coasts of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. During the Soviet era, this
line marked the Soviet-Iranian border in the Caspian
Sea. BP subsequently suspended exploratory drilling
at the site, scheduled for 2002. ExxonMobil also postponed the development of the offshore Savalan block,
citing concerns about the unclarified legal status of
the Caspian Sea. The 850-square-km block is located
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in the southern sector of the Caspian, an area that is
the focus of a border dispute between Azerbaijan and
Iran. These territorial disputes contribute to tensions
between the two countries, which are exacerbated
by Azerbaijan’s burgeoning relationship with Israel
(see Table 3).
Name
Azeri, Chirag
(Khazar, Osman)

Who?
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan

Kyapaz (Serdar)

Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan

Araz, Alov and Sharq
(Alborz)

Azerbaijan
Iran

Table 3. Fields Under Dispute.
Azerbaijan has also failed to resolve a dispute with
Turkmenistan over ownership of specific fields in the
Caspian, notably the Kyapaz field—called Serdar by
Turkmenistan—which has estimated reserves of over
50 million tons. In May 2001, Turkmenistan threatened Azerbaijan with legal action after the failure of
bilateral talks between the two countries on several
disputed oil fields. The Azeri and Chirag fields, which
are being developed by the AIOC as part of the “contract of the century,” are also in dispute. Turkmenistan calls these fields Khazar and Osman and claims
they lie partly in Turkmen territorial waters. Azerbaijan has offered to jointly develop the fields with
Turkmenistan, but the latter has refused and, in 2009,
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov announced that
the government would seek dispute resolution at the
International Court of Arbitration.50
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Azerbaijan is the only littoral state to have formally
asserted its sovereignty over its sector of the Caspian
Sea in any official document. The country’s constitution states that “[t]he internal waters of the Republic
of Azerbaijan, the sector of the Caspian Sea (lake)
belonging to the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the air
space over the Republic . . . are integral parts” of the
country’s territory.51 Despite the ongoing ownership
disputes with Iran and Turkmenistan, the country
has continued to develop its Caspian hydrocarbon resources and press ahead with negotiations on the proposed TKG highlighting Baku’s belief that agreement
on demarcation among all five states is not necessarily vital. In spite of Azerbaijan’s confidence, the lack
of consensus on the Sea’s legal status impacts upon
maritime navigation, environmental protection, pipeline construction, and exploitation of the Sea’s natural
resources, including its hydrocarbons and sturgeon.
THE CASPIAN AND RUSSIAN SECURITY
The Caspian Sea is part of Russia’s “southern
underbelly” (yuzhnaya podbryush’ye), a term that underscores the sense of vulnerability it feels along its
southern border (which also includes the Caucasus). A
2009 article in the Russian military journal, Voennaya
Mysl’, emphasized the significance of the “south,” describing it as “the most worrying in terms of ensuring
the national security of the Russian Federation. It is
on our southern flank that events occur which directly
affect national security and require a clear definition
of Russia’s geopolitical interests.”52 As discussed previously, the area is rich in resources, but also contains
contested borders, increasing tension between states,
notably Azerbaijan and Iran, and numerous trans-
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national security challenges, including unresolved
conflicts, organized crime, trafficking, and migration.
Furthermore, it is an arena of competition between
the principal regional and external powers. Thus, the
Caspian is vital for Russian national security, both in
terms of its natural resources and as a source of an array of cross-border security challenges, as evinced by
the Caspian Flotilla’s combat capability upgrade.
Russia’s 2009 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the principal threats to Russian national security,
including extremism, transnational criminal organizations, and illegal trafficking, noting that the protection
of state borders was crucial to tackling these and preventing them from undermining Russian security. It
identifies the Caspian region as an area from which
particular challenges to Russian national interests and
security may emanate and states that, in the future,
there may be a competition for natural resources between states, which could lead to greater interest to
traditionally Russian areas of interest:
In the long term, the attention of international politics
will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including in the Middle East . . ., the Arctic, in the Caspian basin and in Central Asia. . . . Under conditions
of competition for resources, it is not excluded that
arising problems may be resolved using military force,
and that the current balance of power on the borders
of Russia and its allies may be disturbed.53

The Caspian’s hydrocarbon resources are unquestionably attracting considerable international interest
and involvement, leading to a competition for influence between the major powers—demonstrated most
recently by the sale of an 8.33 percent stake in the
Kashagan development (held by major U.S. oil com-
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pany ConocoPhillips) to China’s CNPC, which was
favored over India’s ONGC. The growing presence of
international actors in the Caspian region is of concern
to Moscow, which perceives it to be a challenge to its
own interests and influence in the area, especially
with regard to pipelines. The NSS goes on to state that:
The resolution of border security problems is achieved
by creating high-technology and multifunctional
border complexes, particularly on the borders with
the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia and
Azerbaijan, and likewise by increasing the effectiveness of state border defence, particularly in the Arctic
zone of the Russian Federation, the Far East and on the
Caspian.54

Russia’s western coastline on the Caspian is a volatile neighborhood, containing the ongoing insurgency
in the North Caucasus, which has engulfed Dagestan
on the Caspian Sea. Although Moscow formally declared the end of its “counterterrorism operation” in
Chechnya in the spring of 2009, it is still tackling an
ongoing insurgency across the North Caucasus, and
the region remains very unstable. In 2010, the Russian
authorities admitted that the situation had deteriorated significantly, and that it is fighting an insurgency
throughout the region. There has been a continuous
campaign of assassinations targeted against local officials, particularly clerics and security representatives,
and a string of terrorist attacks against economic targets such as railway lines, gas pipelines, and other
strategic infrastructure. While the situation in Chechnya provided the inspiration for growing radicalism
across the North Caucasus, recent violence in the region has been fueled by corrupt local governments,
poverty, and the Kremlin’s policy of seeking to exert
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direct control over republics; for example, appointing
regional leaders instead of allowing them to be elected
locally, as was previously the case. Dagestan, on the
Caspian’s western coast, has been particularly badly
affected by the insurgency. This is of concern to the
Caspian Flotilla, as the Kaspisyk base, where several
of the most potent new ships are based (including the
Gepard class Dagestan and Tatarstan), is located only
20 km from the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala.
Interestingly, when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu identified three principal military threats
to Russian security in November 2013, the North Caucasus insurgency was not on the list, although international Islamist terrorism was. In addition to this, he
specified the withdrawal of Western coalition forces
from Afghanistan in 2014 and continued NATO enlargement on Russia’s borders.55 The Russian government is very concerned about the impact of ISAF’s
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 and the potential for instability affecting its Central Asian neighbors and, ultimately, Russia. Konstantin Sokolov, vice
president of Russia’s Academy of Geopolitical Problems, highlighted Russian concerns about instability
in the wider Middle East region spreading to Russia
and the Caspian region:
What happens in the Near East reaches Russia fairly
quickly. The conflict will move in the direction of Iran,
and this is already the Caspian region. If combat operations begin in Iran, the strategic ties between that
country and China, which receives energy sources
from Iran, will be disturbed. There is a danger of the
undermining of stability in Central Asia. It would not
be difficult to do this, because the economic situation
of the majority of inhabitants there is very difficult.
From there, the conflict would cross into Russia.56
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The upgrade of the Caspian Flotilla highlights the
sense of vulnerability Russia feels along its southern
periphery. Stability and predictability are core concerns for Russia in the Caspian region, and Russia is
seeking to assert its control over the area to ensure
these objectives, which potentially could be undermined by security challenges such as the activity of
terrorist and extremist groups and criminal organizations, as well as the increasing influence of external
actors, particularly the United States and the West.
Russia is keen to reassert its influence, both within the
Caspian region and across the former Soviet space, to
counter the perceived expansion of Western involvement, within its “sphere of influence.” The decision to
upgrade the Caspian Flotilla was made over a decade
ago, at a time of growing concern about rising Western interest in the region. On his arrival in the Kremlin
in 2000, Putin was determined to reassert Russian influence in the Caspian region to counter the growing
influence of external actors such as Turkey, the United
Kingdom (UK) and the United States. The issue was
considered of such importance that it was discussed
at a session of the Russian Security Council in April
2000. Putin was quoted in Russian media reports
as stating:
We must understand that the interest of our partners
in other countries—Turkey, Great Britain, and the
USA—toward the Caspian Sea is not accidental. This
is because we are not active. We must not turn the
Caspian Sea into yet another area of confrontation, no
way. We just have to understand that nothing will fall
into our lap out of the blue, like manna from heaven. This is a matter of competition and we must be
competitive.57
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Putin’s statement reflects the broader Russian political narrative, which remains dominated by talk of
“competition” and the need to be “competitive” with
the West, highlighting the zero-sum approach that
Moscow tends to take in its foreign policy: the statement above suggests there is little room for cooperation or collaboration. Russia’s response to suggestions
that the United States may establish a presence at the
Kazakh port of Aqtau, as a means of getting its military equipment out of Afghanistan, highlighted its opposition to the presence of any external actors in the
closed system of the Caspian Sea, as mentioned earlier. Russian sentiments reflect those of the other littoral states: the leaders of the Caspian Five have long
made it clear that the presence of external forces in the
Sea would not be tolerated. This was noted in a formal
document for the first time in the declaration signed
by the Caspian Five at the Second Summit Meeting
of Caspian Heads of State held in 2007 in Tehran, in
which the littoral states formally agreed to deny access to third states who wished to use the region to
launch military operations against any Caspian state,
in an attempt to promote stability across the region.
The declaration also stated that only littoral states
were permitted to deploy ships and military forces in
the Sea, again seeking to limit the influence of external
actors, particularly the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Regional stability is particularly important for Caspian states, as
instability or renewed conflict could have a negative
impact on the development of their hydrocarbon potential, including the construction of new export infrastructure, and deter vital foreign investment, ultimately undermining their economic development and
possible internal political stability.
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It has been suggested that an important objective
of Russian foreign policy is the establishment of a
multipolar world, an aim that can be achieved by securing the country’s geopolitical interests in various
“vectors” encompassing the “southern geopolitical
vector,” which includes the Caspian region and the
Caucasus.58 This is reflected in key Russian strategic
documents, including the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept,
2009 National Security Strategy and 2010 Military Doctrine. All three documents emphasize the importance
of a multipolar world, reflecting Moscow’s unhappiness with U.S. dominance of the international system,
which it feels is destabilizing. The Kremlin has become increasingly concerned about growing U.S. (and
European) influence in areas traditionally perceived
as Russia’s “strategic backyard,” that is, in former
Soviet states such as Georgia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics. In an attempt to counterbalance
Western influence in the post-Soviet space and retain
its leverage, the Kremlin is seeking to reassert its influence by political, economic, and military means. The
military aspect of this approach is vital, as it provides
credibility to the potential to project influence: without an effective and visible military capability, Russia’s ability to influence events in the Caspian would
be undermined. Thus, the efficacy of Russian efforts
to preserve its influence has been underpinned by its
considerable military footprint across the “south.”
THE CASPIAN FLOTILLA
The Caspian is central to the maintenance of Russian national security, both in terms of its natural resources and as a source of an array of cross-border
security challenges, demonstrated by the Caspian
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Flotilla’s combat capability upgrade. The Russian
Ministry of Defence describes the Caspian Flotilla as
“the guarantor of the integrity of maritime boundaries
and the most important foreign policy tool of the state
in the Caspian Sea,”59 highlighting the significance of
the Flotilla for contemporary Russian security and the
reason it is one of Russia’s only naval forces that has
seen a growth in strength, rather than a reduction, in
recent years, under Putin’s leadership.
Following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991,
the Soviet Caspian Flotilla was divided evenly between
the four former Soviet littoral states on the Caspian:
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan ceded their share to
Moscow, which operated a joint flotilla under Russian
command.60 This joint flotilla was transitory, however,
and the newly independent states soon decided to establish their own independent naval capabilities. The
Flotilla’s base moved from Baku (now in independent
Azerbaijan) to Astrakhan, a Russian port city at the
mouth of the Volga River. It is estimated that Russia’s
Caspian Flotilla initially comprised only of two frigates, approximately 12 patrol boats and some smaller
vessels, and there was little investment in new equipment. This changed with Putin’s arrival in the Kremlin in 2000. One of his first priorities on taking power
was to halt the perceived decline of the Russian armed
forces. A program of reform was launched to modernize the armed forces, making them smaller, more affordable, and more flexible, configured to fight small,
low-intensity regional conflicts as well as high-intensity global war. Military reform has led to cuts in both
personnel and equipment, with the aim of creating
a more mobile military with an expeditionary focus.
The Pacific Fleet was slated to lose 5,000 personnel,
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while overall the Navy’s inventory was expected to be
slashed from 240 vessels to 123 by 2016.61
However, there has also been considerable investment in modernization and rearmament. In September
2010, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov
declared that annual defense spending for the period
2010-20 was expected to equate to 3.8 percent of the
gross domestic product.62 In 2011, Dmitry Medvedev
announced that over U.S.$700 billion would be allocated to modernize Russia’s defense armaments over
the period 2011-20, although it was revealed in August
2012 that as much as 70 percent of this would be held
until after 2016.63 Thus, the modernization of the Caspian Flotilla is part of a wider expansion and renewal
of Russia’s naval (and broader military) capabilities.
The Flotilla has recovered from the collapse of the
USSR in 1991 (and the subsequent redeployment from
Baku to Astrakhan) and has been the focus of significant investment in recent years: by 2020, the Caspian
Flotilla will have received as many as 16 new vessels,
a striking amount for a relatively minor fleet operating in a closed basin (see Table 4). In addition to new
vessels, the Flotilla has also acquired a new base at
Kaspisysk, following a decision by the Russian naval
command in 2010 to concentrate its missile grouping
there. While Astrakhan is still Russia’s principal port
on the Caspian, it has invested in the development of
this new port in the volatile North Caucasus republic
of Dagestan.
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Name

Class

Type

Year Commissioned

Dagestan

Gepard

Frigate

2012

Tatarstan

Gepard

Frigate

2003

Makhachkala

Buyan

Corvette

2012

Volgodonsk

Buyan

Corvette

2011

Astrakhan

Buyan

Corvette

2006

Grad Sviyazhsk

Buyan-M

Corvette

2013

Uglich

Buyan-M

Corvette

2013

Veliky Ustyug

Buyan-M

Corvette

under construction

Zelyony Dol

Buyan-M

Corvette

under construction

Serpukhov

Buyan-M

Corvette

under construction

Borovsk

Matka

Hydrofoil missile boat

1983

Buddenovsk

Matka

Hydrofoil missile boat

1983

various

Serna

Landing craft

5 in service; 3 purchased in 2013

Table 4. Caspian Flotilla Vessels.
Russia is focused on the establishment of forces that
are able to deploy rapidly and cope with instability on
its periphery, but that also signals its intent to remain
a dominant force in the region. Speaking in 2012 prior
to the commissioning of the Dagestan Gepard class frigate, Dagestani president Magomedsalam Magomedov
voiced his pleasure that “one of Russia’s most powerful ships” was to be based on the Caspian:
It is good news for our foreign allies, and a weighty
argument for those who are not. Today, the Caspian
Sea and Caucasus are places where interests of various
powers intersect, so Russia must have a mighty fleet
here. I’m sure that the frigate Dagestan and further
ships will strengthen that might.64
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The Dagestan is armed with the Kalibr-NK system,
making it far more potent than her sister ship, the
Tatarstan, both of which are located in Kaspisyk. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the frigate, which is “absolutely invisible to enemy radar,” is
armed with cruise missiles that have a range of over
2,000 km and “considerably boost Russia’s military
capability. . . . [N]o other flotilla on the Caspian has
systems effective against both ships and land targets”:
The Dagestan in effect heralds the start of qualitative
and comprehensive re-equipment of the Caspian Flotilla as a whole, moreover, not just technically, but also
conceptually. As early as next year [2013], the Russian
Navy on the Caspian will add at least three more mobile, quick ships armed with cruise missiles. This type
of armament at sea is now becoming the main one. By
2015, the Flotilla will be renewed almost completely.65

The Dagestan frigate is just one of a range of new
vessels that have been commissioned into the Caspian
Flotilla over the past decade (see Table 4), developed
to operate in shallow littoral waters, rather than bluewater operations. The Makhachkala, Volgodonsk, and
Astrakhan are the Caspian Flotilla’s small artillery
ships. These Buyan class littoral patrol vessels cost
an estimated U.S.$20 million each and are relatively
heavily armed for their size, equipped with SA-16
Gubka (Strelets) surface-to-air missiles and a rapidfiring main gun with a 15-km range. Each ship also has
two 30 milimeter (mm) six-barreled AK-630 cannons,
two 14.5-mm machine guns, three 7.62-mm machine
guns and a UMS-73 Grad-M 122-mm multiple rocket
launcher.66 The Buyan-M variant is a more heavily
armed version. The Grad Sviyazhsk is the lead ship of
the Caspian Flotilla’s Buyan-M class small guided-mis-
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sile ship series, which also includes the Uglich, Velikiy
Ustyug, and the Zelenyy Dol (currently under construction in Tatarstan). They are multi-purpose river/sea
ships equipped with the Kalibr-NK anti-ship missile
system, 100-mm and 30-mm guns, as well as Igla-1M
air defense missiles.67 They also incorporate “stealth”
technology for a reduced radar signature: inclined
flat superstructure surfaces, hull skirting, doors, and
hatches concealed within the superstructure and
deck.68 According to the Ministry of Defense, the
Buyan-M class ships are intended to protect Russia’s
offshore economic zones and have been designed to
engage surface warships in littoral areas and rivers.69
This reflects the roles assigned to the Caspian Flotilla,
which includes the protection of Russian shipping, as
well as providing protection to Russian hydrocarbon
production facilities at sea against potential threats,
monitoring the extraction of hydrocarbons and bioresources in disputed areas of the Sea.
In addition to the new vessels, the strike power
of the Flotilla has also been augmented by a separate
coastal missile battalion that was established at the
beginning of 2011, equipped with Bal-E anti-ship missiles with a range of 130 km. Speaking in November
2012, commander of the Caspian Flotilla Rear-Admiral Sergei Alekminskiy discussed the modernization
of the Caspian Flotilla, outlining the Podsolnykh overthe-horizon radar station for aerial and surface observation and the new coastal battalion:
We set up last year, and are making operational this
year, a permanent–readiness shore battery equipped
with the latest Bal missile, which has already been
fired. . . . By 2016 the Caspian Flotilla will have a solid
missile and gunnery group.70
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The Bal coastal missile complex is capable of engaging targets up to 120 km away and includes a selfpropelled command, control, and communications
post, as well as a self-propelled launcher and other
vehicles.71 It has a defensive posture, which raises
questions about the threat Russia sees approaching its
territory from the waters of the Caspian. The acquisition of the system by the Caspian Flotilla also highlights Russia’s sense of vulnerability in the region and
the desire to secure itself against all possible threats,
both traditional state-based threats and nontraditional
transnational security challenges such as trafficking
and extremism. The Russian Navy has also purchased
three additional Serna class landing craft for the Caspian Flotilla in addition to those already in service.
The landing craft are air-cushioned, enabling them
to deploy troops onshore more easily than ordinary
vessels, and can carry either one tank or two infantry
fighting vehicles, or a 92-man landing party.72
The new vessels have been put through their paces
in several national and international exercises in the
Caspian Sea. The Caspian Flotilla took part in Russia’s
annual Kavkaz-2012 exercises, practicing “measures
for maintaining favourable operational conditions in
formations, areas of responsibility, defending the basing area and areas of economic activity, and blockading the coast.”73 Over 500 troops were put through a
“mock offensive” operation, and there was a joint missile firing session that included a strike force of ships
(including the Tatarstan, Dagestan, Borovsk, and Budennovsk) and the BAL coastal defense missile system, firing anti-ship cruise missiles at the “enemy’s” force of
amphibious warfare ships.74 A squad of divers operating from the Astrakhan in the northern Caspian also
fired underwater arms and hand-held grenade launch-
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ers at a sailing object, according to the Interfax-AVN
military news agency. Furthermore, a group of trawlers destroyed mines “using their artillery systems.”75
Speaking at the opening of the Kavkaz-2012 exercises,
Putin stated that the exercises had one objective: “[T]
he Armed Forces must demonstrate their readiness to
defend our national interest and show that they are
ready to decisively rebuff any threats or challenges to
Russia’s national security.”76
The Flotilla held another series of exercises in August 2013, including missile launches, artillery fire, a
simulated sea battle, and minesweeping. A total of 10
warships and support vessels took part, along with
over 1,300 servicemen and a BAL coastal missile system. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense the
BAL missile complex performed a combat exercise
involving the detection and launch of a missile strike
on an adversary’s flotilla.77 Interestingly, the exercise
involved rehearsing maneuvers against an opposing
group of combat vessels, as well as thwarting plans
to land an assault force, all moves that anticipate offensive action from a state, rather than nonstate, actor:
nonstate actors such as transnational extremist groups
are unlikely to deploy a detachment of combat vessels or to be able to marshal the numbers necessary to
land an assault force. This raises questions as to the
perceived threat that the Russians are preparing to
counter. The August 2013 exercises appear to be intended to simulate offensive action by a state, but, as
the Caspian Sea is a closed body of water, this leads to
the conclusion that the state on the attack would be a
littoral state. Furthermore, Russian policy documents
such as the NSS and Military Doctrine indicate that,
with the exception of NATO enlargement, the greatest
national security challenges come from nonstate actors such as criminals, smugglers, and extremists.
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Little wonder that in an article published in 2011,
Mikhail Barabanov dismissed the Caspian Flotilla,
stating that its existence did not “make any practical
sense because of the weakness of the naval forces of
the other Caspian states and the absence of any real
missions with respect to the combat use of the flotilla.”78 Questions over the Flotilla’s combat role were
also highlighted during Tsentr-2011, an exercise held
for member-states of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) that included a joint exercise
that involved Russia’s Caspian Flotilla, the Kazakh
Navy, and the air forces of both countries repelling
a theoretical attack against Kazakhstan—the objective of which was to seize oil fields. According to an
analysis of the exercise in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the
Russo-Kazakh grouping “repelled massive enemy
missile strikes, the landing of a hostile amphibious assault force and a ground invasion by . . . mechanised
columns.”79 However, the analysis raised questions
about the perceived enemy:
From where in a closed sea-lake, the only exit from
which is completely controlled by Russia, will you
get enemy ship groupings, capable of landing assault
forces and supporting them with fire from the sea?
And in the process this mysterious enemy will also
inflict massive air strikes and will carry out a ground
invasion! What country is this? Is it really Iran? There
simply aren’t any other candidates, as the ships of
non-littoral states cannot enter the Caspian Sea without Russian authorisation. But the Iranian Navy is totally incapable of conducting these operations on the
Caspian.80
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OTHER CASPIAN NAVIES
Russia’s investment in its Caspian Flotilla has been
reflected by an increase in expenditure and capabilities
of the other four littoral states. After years of underfunding, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
have been upgrading their naval capabilities recently,
largely to ensure better control over their oil and gas
reserves and installations in the Caspian.
Kazakhstan.
Although it withdrew from the joint flotilla under
Russian command in 1994, it was not until 2003, more
than 10 years after independence, that Kazakhstan established its own naval forces. The decision followed
the discovery of the giant Kashagan offshore oilfield
and the realization that an effective naval force was
required, if only to protect the country’s hydrocarbon
installations and resources. Its 2011 Military Doctrine
identified the need to upgrade “military and other
infrastructure” in the Caspian region, noting that the
“unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea, the effort
of some Caspian countries to increase their military
capability, and the disputed oilfields could worsen
the regional military-political situation.”81 According
to Commander in Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral
Zhandarbek Zhanzakov, the upgrading of the Caspian Flotilla is also a factor in the development of a
Kazakh navy:
[A]nalysis of the naval forces of our neighbours shows their
rapid development in order to change the current state of
affairs in their favour. For example, two frigates—Tatarstan
and Dagestan—equipped with modern missile systems
and the new generation. . . . Astrakhan, built using stealth
technology. . . .82
45

In 2012, Kazakhstan launched its first domestically
built Katran class missile patrol ship, the Kazakhstan,
equipped with “modernised anti-aircraft missile and
artillery units.” The ship is the first of three to be built
at the Zenit shipyards in Uralsk, Kazakhstan.83 According to a 2012 report in Jane’s Navy International,
Kazakhstan also intends to procure three corvettes,
possibly from South Korea,84 and there were also reports that it was considering the MBDA MM40 Exocet
Block 3 anti-ship missile as a coastal defense weapon.85
Nevertheless, despite these plans and the modernization of port infrastructure at Aqtau, Kuryk, and Bautino, Kazakhstan has one of the weakest naval forces in
the Caspian region, and the country needs to develop
its naval forces to be able to protect its interests in the
Caspian Sea and provide security for its offshore oil
and gas installations, particularly Kashagan. As noted
earlier, the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea is much
shallower and thus impacts upon security: the offshore Kashagan field is potentially vulnerable, since
it is located in shallow waters that freeze in winter,
facilitating access by poachers, for example.
Azerbaijan.
Like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan’s defense priorities in
the Caspian Sea are to protect its coastline and guard
oil and gas installations. Despite significant spending
on defense (reported to be over U.S.$3 billion in 2013),
Azerbaijan has prioritized spending on its land and air
forces, rather than its navy, because of the unresolved
dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. There
has been some investment in naval capabilities, and
Azerbaijan intends to boost its capacities in the Cas-
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pian as part of a naval modernization program. A new
base for the country’s naval forces is under construction at Puta (in Baku’s Garabagh district), to replace
the historic base in Baku, which should be operational
by 2014, and the country also has plans to commence
indigenous production of warships, although few
details of this have been released.86
The U.S. Caspian Guard initiative has strengthened the naval capabilities of both Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, providing training and equipment to the
two countries in an attempt to help address counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and illicit trafficking as
well as the protection of key economic zones, particularly hydrocarbon installations. Launched in 2003, the
Caspian Guard has assisted the two countries in the
integration of their airspace and maritime surveillance
and control systems; their national command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence systems; and their reaction and response forces.87 American aid was forthcoming to assist Azerbaijan’s State
Border Service in installing engineering equipment
on the country’s southern borders in order to boost
security, and the service was presented with U.S. cutters. Joint U.S.-Azeri naval exercises have been held
in the Caspian Sea, highlighting the strategic importance of the region to the United States.88 The exercise
angered Iran, which accused Baku of breaching an
agreement between the Caspian Five that other countries not become involved in the settlement of regional
problems.89
The United States has supplied Azerbaijan’s naval
vessels with radar and communication equipment to
help improve command and control.90 These initiatives have facilitated the development of new capabilities aimed at countering terrorism as well as smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime on the
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Caspian Sea. Furthermore, as part of the Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program,
Azerbaijan’s coastal security has been strengthened
by the use of a series of coastal radar stations, which,
according to the U.S. State Department, is used “by
the Navy, Coast Guard, and State Border Service to
conduct maritime surveillance and detect smuggling
threats.”91 However, these capability enhancements
have focused on “softer” security challenges and,
according to one assessment, have “not given Azerbaijan any offensive capabilities beyond an enhanced
command and control and radar-based surface monitoring system, thereby depriving Azerbaijan of . . .
the ability for real power projection.”92 This could be
changed if the country begins to develop its own naval warships. According to a report on the website of
Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman in October 2012,
Azerbaijan has ordered anti-ship missiles from Israel.
The article analyzed this order in the context of poor
relations between Baku and Tehran, and Iran’s “aggressive” behavior with regard to the Caspian Sea.93
Continuing tension between Azerbaijan and Iran has
been exacerbated by Baku’s burgeoning relationship
with Israel. Israel is reportedly providing Azerbaijan
with Gabriel-5 anti-ship missiles, possibly to counter
any potential threat from Iran. The growing number
of Iranian naval vessels in the Caspian would enable
Iran to support its territorial claims in the Sea and
bring it into conflict with Azerbaijan.
Turkmenistan.
Like those of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan’s navy is also undergoing expansion after
years of underfunding, as the government seeks to
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ensure it is able to control and protect its hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian amid its ownership dispute with Azerbaijan. Until recently, Turkmenistan
was considered to have the weakest navy among the
Caspian littoral states: long regarded as constituting
little more than a coastguard service, the navy has
been upgrading both its infrastructure and fleet to
improve its capabilities. The United States has provided Turkmenistan with a patrol boat, Point Jackson,
to boost maritime security on the Caspian Sea, and,
in 2009, Turkmenistan procured two Russian-built patrol boats with speeds of up to 50 knots.94 Two years
later, it acquired two Russian-built Molniya class Project 12418 corvettes, armed with 16 Uran-E missile
systems each, and reportedly has plans for procuring
three more in the near future.95 Turkmenistan also ordered two 57m NTPB (new Type Patrol Boat) vessels
from the Dearsan Shipyard in Turkey in 2010. According to a report in 2011, the Turkmen navy and coastguard constituted around 2,000 personnel and 16 vessels, up from less than 1,000 in 2006.96 The new vessels
are equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, several
guns, and short-range Igla manportable missiles. In
addition to the purchase of new vessels, in 2009 President Berdymukhamedov announced plans to establish a naval base on the country’s southern Caspian
coastline.97 The base is intended to facilitate the protection of maritime borders and protect the state from
external threats such as smuggling and terrorism. The
Turkmen president made it clear that the navy would
not be used to settle territorial disputes with its neighbors, warning that there are “international terrorist
groups” who would “like to disturb the Turkmen
people’s peaceful life.”98 Berdymukhamedov has said
that the establishment of the Turkmen navy should be
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completed by 2015, but has not specified how large it
will be. Although these acquisitions have significantly
improved Turkmenistan’s naval capabilities in the
Caspian Sea, it remains one of the weaker naval forces
in the region.
Iran.
Under the terms of the Russian-Persian agreements
of the 19th century (the 1813 Treaty of Gulestan and the
1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai), Iran was not permitted to
develop its naval forces in the Caspian Sea. This ban
was maintained in the Soviet-Iranian treaties of 1921
and 1940, so it was not until the 1990s that Iran was
able to focus on the development of a Caspian fleet.
Over the past decade, Iran has sought to make up for
lost time and has begun to build up its naval capabilities in the Caspian. The naval base at the commercial
port of Bandar-Anzali has been developed, while the
infrastructure at other Caspian ports such as Nowshahr and Babolsar is reported to have undergone
modernization.99 In 2004, Tehran launched a Sina class
fast attack craft, launching another two in 2006 and
2009,100 and in March 2013, it announced the launch
of the Jamaran-2 Mowdge class frigate (the Velayat) into
the Caspian Sea at the port of Bandar-Anzali. Iranian
officials described the indigenously manufactured Jamaran-2 as a message of “peace and friendship,” although, inaugurating the vessel, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad undermined this message by describing
the ship as a “destroyer there to meet those who want
to jeopardise the security of surrounding nations.”101
According to Iran’s Press-TV, production of the Jamaran-2 frigate began 2 years ago specifically with the
“aim of protecting Iran’s 20 percent share of the Cas-

50

pian Sea.”102 This statement highlights Iran’s determination to increase its territorial claim in the Caspian,
from the 14 percent accorded it under international
law to the 20 percent it believes it is actually due. The
launch of the frigate heightened concerns about Iranian intentions to support its territorial claims in the
Caspian. At 94 meters long, the frigate is the second
largest warship in the Caspian after Russia’s two Gepard class frigates, the Dagestan and Tatarstan. Harmer
believes the frigate’s launch was intended to “underscore the extent of Iranian commitment to protecting
and possibly expanding its interests in the Caspian”
and reinforced a 2012 minelaying and minesweeping
exercise held in Iran’s sector of the Sea, which “was . . .
part of a broader Iranian effort to secure its territorial
claims in the Caspian.”103 He goes on to argue that,
whatever its intentions may be, “it is a sign of Iranian
resiliency and depth of industrial capacity that the
Islamic Republic is able to conduct significant exercises and launch indigenously produced ships along
multiple fronts.”104
The launch of the Jamaran-2 followed an Iranian
threat in June 2012 to deploy Ghadir class midget submarines in the Caspian against a backdrop of worsening relations with Baku over the latter’s blossoming
relationship with Israel. One analyst suggested the
threatened deployment and expanded naval capabilities in the Caspian could enable Iran to deter any
further cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel.105
Certainly, Iran’s capabilities in the Caspian Sea are no
longer solely defensive: they have acquired offensive
capabilities.
Iran’s development of its naval capabilities in the
Caspian is an important factor in the reshaping of Russian-Iranian relations, which could see the two states
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expanding their political cooperation into more active
military cooperation. Putin has made mention in the
past of forming some kind of alliance with Tehran, but
this has been undermined by the fact that both states
have very different expectations of their relationship.
Nevertheless, they do share a common desire to limit
the influence of external actors in the Caspian region,
particularly the United States. Russia and Iran are
seeking to strengthen their bilateral relationship, including naval cooperation, to boost maritime security
in the Caspian Sea and ensure that their influence is
not eroded by the appearance of actors from outside
of the region. Speaking in November 2012, commander of the Caspian Flotilla Rear-Admiral Sergei Alekminskiy suggested that ships from the Caspian Flotilla could pay their first visit in 40 years to an Iranian
port during 2013, stating that the Minister of Foreign
Affairs would decide whether such a visit should go
ahead, but that “we wish to see how the Iranian fleet is
progressing.”106 This wish was partially fulfilled when
two Iranian vessels docked in Astrakhan for 4 days in
June 2013, the first time Iranian naval ships had been
to Russia. According to Iran’s defense attaché in Moscow Colonel Soleiman Adeli, the Iranian-built ships
were intended to “consolidate maritime relations between Tehran and Moscow, and promote peace and
friendship” among the five littoral states:
Iran and Russia both want Caspian Sea littoral states
to maintain the security of the body of water without
any interference from extra-regional powers. They regard the presence of outsiders in the sea as a source of
tension and division.107

The two countries appear to be seeking to use their
expanding naval capabilities to maintain the status
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quo in the Caspian Sea region, which is to their own
advantage, and deter other littoral states from developing effective relationships with external actors. This
undermines the sovereignty of those states and their
ability to pursue an autonomous foreign policy. It also
has significant implications for states outside the region, such as the United States, who wish to deepen
their engagement with, and influence on, the Caspian
states. If Moscow and Tehran can get over their mutual suspicions and rivalry, they could be a powerful
international force. Their relationship is driven by
economic pragmatism and self-interest: Iran is a key
economic partner for Russia, one of its largest customers for conventional weapons, as well as nuclear
energy. Russia has also been one of Iran’s biggest supports in the United Nations, blocking sanctions and
resolutions that would damage Iran and its ally, Syria.
However, although Moscow is a strong supporter of
Iran’s right to develop a peaceful nuclear program, it
is wary of Tehran’s nuclear aspirations and certainly
does not want to encourage the development of a nuclear power on its southern periphery.
COMPETING OR COOPERATING?
Russia is clearly wary of Iranian motives in the
Caspian, but it is also keen to prevent any external
actor gaining a foothold in the region, which is very
unlikely given the closed nature of the Sea. Table 5
illustrates Russian naval dominance in the region. Although there are no figures for Iran’s naval presence
on the Caspian Sea, the fact that it has only recently
started to develop its naval capabilities in the region
suggests the number of Iranian vessels on the Caspian
is minimal and currently poses little challenge to Rus-

53

sia. However, Iran is in the process of developing its
naval forces in the Caspian, which may, in the future,
threaten Moscow’s dominance. In his State of the Nation speech in December 2013, Putin affirmed that
Russia will not allow any country to achieve military
superiority over it, stating that:
no one should entertain any illusions about achieving
military superiority over Russia; we will never allow
it. Russia will respond to all these challenges, both political and technological. We have all we need in order
to do so.108

Azerbaijan

Population
(million)
9.49

Armed Forces

Navy

66,950

2,200

Iran

78.86

523,000

In Caspian?

Kazakhstan

17.52

39,000

3,000

5.05

22,000

142.86

845,000

500
20,000
(Caspian Flotilla)

Turkmenistan
Russia

Table 5. Caspian Naval Forces.
The developments outlined in Table 5 suggest that
the Caspian Sea is becoming increasingly militarized
and raise the specter of a potential arms race in the region: where Russia leads, the other four littoral states
are bound to follow. If Moscow is arming itself to defend against an array of perceived security challenges,
then logically the other Caspian states are bound to
be impacted by this. However, the littoral states are
aware of the potential escalation that ongoing militarization may bring. In 1992, Iran stressed that the
Caspian was a “sea of peace and friendship,” calling
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for it to remain “nonmilitary.”109 The theme of peace
and cooperation has been continued, and Azerbaijan’s
President Ilham Aliyev has stated:
Azerbaijan has always favoured demilitarisation of
the Caspian. Although we have a navy to help us protect our interests, we believe that the Caspian should
be demilitarised, it must become a zone of peace. Cooperation, not rivalry, should prevail.110

Speaking at the 34th meeting of the Working
Group on the Convention on the legal status of the
Caspian Sea held in Moscow in November 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stressed that under contemporary conditions, “it is crucially important to keep the Caspian region as a zone of peace,
friendship and good neighbourliness.”111 He went on
to say that Russia will continue using existing mechanisms to address “all fundamental Caspian issues
only among ‘the five’ whose members have exclusive
sovereign rights over the sea and its resources,” again
highlighting Russia’s opposition to external actors
playing any role in the negotiations.112 In his view,
interference by external actors in Caspian issues does
not help in their resolution. In an attempt to counter
what it perceived to be a growing U.S. influence in the
Caspian region (evidenced by Caspian Guard and the
growing presence of international energy companies),
in 2005 Lavrov proposed the creation of a common
regional security alliance to include all five littoral
states, the Caspian Naval Group for Operational Cooperation (KASFOR). The initiative was designed to
counter common security challenges such as terrorism
and potential military threats. However, the proposal
failed to gain the support of all littoral states, some
of whom were wary of joining a Russian-dominated
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security structure: although Iran was one of the first
states to voice its support for the grouping, Azerbaijan
refused to join, while Turkmenistan’s declared policy
of neutrality in international affairs precluded its participation. KASFOR remains on the drawing board,
and there is no single regional security system that
includes all five Caspian states. In 2006, Russia proposed the establishment of a regional rapid reaction
force in the Caspian Sea to tackle terrorism and other
security challenges, another proposal that failed to get
off the ground.113
There have been several other feeble attempts by
the Caspian Five to establish multilateral cooperation
on issues of regional security, with varying degrees of
success. The first Summit Meeting of Caspian Heads
of State took place in Turkmenistan in 2002. Despite
agreeing to meet on an annual basis thereafter, the second meeting took place 5 years later in Tehran. At that
meeting, the Caspian Five leaders adopted a 25-point
declaration that pledged to seek to build and enhance
mutual confidence, regional security, and stability,
calling for:
peaceful, just, and stable solutions to conflicts in line
with the United Nations charter, also taking into account sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders to ensure
security, peace and stability in the region.114

They formally agreed to deny access to third
states who wished to use the region to launch military operations against any Caspian state, stating that
“. . . they will not allow other countries to use their territories for acts of aggression or other military operations against any party.”115 The leaders of the Caspian
Five have long made it clear that the presence of ex56

ternal forces in the Sea will not be tolerated, although
the 2007 Summit declaration was the first time it was
noted in a formal document. The declaration stated
that only the littoral states were permitted to deploy
ships and military forces in the sea, again seeking to
limit the influence of external actors, particularly the
United States and NATO. The declaration also provided for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes and stated that the signatories bore “responsibility for damage inflicted on Caspian resources and
to any Caspian state from the use of the Caspian Sea
and development of its resources.”116 Despite being
hailed by the Iranian president as a “turning point”
in Caspian relations, there was no substantive change,
and the 2007 declaration has proved to be little more
than political rhetoric.
At the third Caspian summit held in Baku in 2010,
a further 15-point declaration was signed, which included provision for multilateral cooperation on security issues, particularly environmental security, terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, trafficking, and
illegal migration. One of the key points of the Agreement on Security Cooperation in the Caspian Sea was
that the status of the Sea was to be determined only
by the Caspian littoral countries, again highlighting
the unwillingness of the Caspian Five to allow the involvement of any external actors. Russia and Iran are
keen to ensure that they remain the dominant actors
in the region and do not wish to see any third states,
particularly the United States, establish any formal
presence on the negotiating process over the Caspian’s legal status. This reflects Russian (and Iranian)
intolerance of any increased U.S./NATO presence in a
region it considers to be its “sphere of privileged interest.” Russia’s response to suggestions that the United
States may establish a presence at the Kazakh port of
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Aqtau, as a means of getting its military equipment
out of Afghanistan, highlighted its opposition to the
presence of any external actors in the closed system
of the Caspian Sea. An article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta
argued that if Aqtau became a base for “the Pentagon
and its allies,” the “already fragile Caspian security
architecture would effectively collapse.”117 In the article, Stanislav Pritchin from the Centre for the Study
of Central Asia and the Caucasus warns that the presence of U.S. military personnel on the Caspian “will
lead to an arms race in the region, particularly on the
part of Russia and Iran.”118 Aleksandr Knyazev believes that both Russia and Iran have, until recently,
“closed their eyes” to the U.S. presence in the region,
particularly the American military support given to
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the development of
their naval forces.119
As can be seen from the preceding paragraphs,
there is very little security architecture in place in the
Caspian region to actually “collapse.” There is some,
very minimal cooperation between the Caspian Five,
particularly on environmental issues, but, on the
whole, the Sea remains dominated by Russia and its
sizeable military presence. The lukewarm response to
the KASFOR initiative has not deterred Russia from
seeking to boost military cooperation among the littoral states and, as discussed previously, there have
been several joint and combined military exercises
involving the Caspian states, but this cooperation is
negligible. The CSTO held its first joint peacekeeping exercises in Kazakhstan in October 2012: Nerushimoye-bratstvo-2012 (Unbreakable brotherhood-2012)
involved the establishment of a collective peacekeeping force in a Central Asian CSTO member-state experiencing “a crisis situation as a result of activities
of international extremist and terrorist organizations,
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as well as disputes between ethnic groups.”120 This
reflects concern across the region about possible instability emanating from Afghanistan in the wake of
ISAF’s withdrawal in 2014. Nevertheless, in spite of
common concerns about instability from Afghanistan
spilling over, unified action amongst the Caspian
Five to mitigate any risk remains negligible, as the
littoral states remain focused on national, rather than
regional, solutions.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nearly 300 years old, the Caspian Flotilla has been
undergoing an extensive upgrade, which has increased
its capabilities significantly and signals Russian intent
to remain the dominant power in the region: Moscow
has firmly established its military dominance in the
Caspian Sea, enhancing its maritime footprint and
boosting its ability to shape the strategic environment.
It is keen to secure its unstable “southern underbelly,”
and the Caspian Flotilla is intended to protect Russia’s
national interests and control a volatile region under
threat from transnational security challenges, such as
poaching, migration, a potential increase in drug trafficking as Afghanistan struggles to survive economically post-2014, and the movement of international
extremist organizations. It is imperative to recognize
Russia’s sense of vulnerability on its southern periphery, which is the source of many security challenges,
and also Russia’s desire to remain the predominant
power in the region, which has increased in significance since 1991 with the growing interest of external
actors. Russia has strong historical, cultural, economic, and societal ties with the region and the “south” is
one area where it remains the hegemon; no other state
has yet established a presence to rival that of Russia.
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The Caspian Sea has been vital for the security of
Russia and its southern periphery since the 18th century. There are significant similarities between historical
events and contemporary circumstances in the region,
and the drivers of international interest in the Caspian Sea have changed little: the region’s geostrategic
significance, with Iran lying directly to the south, the
vital importance of economic factors and maintaining
access to natural resources, as well as lucrative trade
routes, the competition for influence between different regional powers, and concern about the influence
of external actors on the development of the region.
Over the past few decades, the Caspian Sea has become pivotal for the United States (and the West),
both in terms of its hydrocarbons, which provide an
alternative source to Middle Eastern and Russian resources, and as an important transit route for the ISAF
logistics operation. The decision to upgrade the Caspian Flotilla was made when Putin came to power at
the beginning of 2000 and identified Russia’s south,
and the Caspian region, as an area of strategic interest.
The Russian narrative was (and remains) dominated by talk of “competition” and the need to be
“competitive” with the West, which was perceived to
be encroaching into an area that had previously been
Moscow’s exclusive zone of influence. The Caspian’s
natural resources, most notably its hydrocarbons,
have led to the increased presence and influence of external actors, particularly from the United States and
Europe, in a region that had been dominated by Russia for centuries. Oil and gas are the principal reasons
for the interest of the West in the region, although the
need to develop new transit routes in and out of Afghanistan has led to renewed interest in the region.
Moscow has tolerated limited U.S. military support
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for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in terms of training
and equipment support through the Caspian Guard
initiative. However, the potential establishment of a
transhipment base at Aqtau could exacerbate existing
tensions in the region. Any such base developed on the
Caspian Sea should be purely a civilian endeavor: the
presence of U.S. military personnel and/or a U.S. military establishment in the region would be perceived as
a provocative step by Moscow, which, as mentioned
earlier, is determined to contain the influence of external actors. Russia is seeking to maintain the status quo
in the Caspian Sea and ensure that its influence is not
eroded by the appearance of actors from outside of
the region, particularly by the U.S. and Western actors
such as NATO. The United States should continue to
develop its relations with states in the Caspian region,
while acknowledging the significance of Russia’s role
in the region, as well as the sense of vulnerability it
feels on its southern periphery.
The Caspian Sea is a unique area in several respects: its abundant natural resources, the lack of clear
legal status, the growing presence and influence of
external actors, and Russia’s relations with its neighbors. Russia does not have complete sovereignty over
the Caspian Sea: it shares responsibility for governing the area with four other states, three of which are
former Soviet states, making it harder for Moscow to
influence and shape the environment to its liking. The
region is also where Russia faces significant challenges to its national interests from transnational threats,
such as terrorism, insurgency, poaching, and smuggling. This is reflected in the upgrade of the Caspian
Flotilla, which has acquired a number of new vessels
designed to operate in shallow littoral waters, rather
than blue-water operations, and conduct low-intensity
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maritime security operations such as the protection of
Russian shipping and Russian offshore hydrocarbon
production facilities, as well as monitoring the extraction of hydrocarbons and bio-resources in disputed
areas of the Sea. The Flotilla’s upgrade highlights the
sense of vulnerability Russia feels in its south: stability and predictability are core concerns for Russia in
the Caspian region and it is seeking to assert its control over the area to ensure these objectives. The new
equipment being procured for the Flotilla is both defensive and offensive: the stealth capabilities would
suggest an offensive posture, while the BAL coastal
missile system is clearly defensive. The improvements
to the Flotilla’s capabilities are also indicative of how
well Russia is reconfiguring its armed forces to tackle
the security challenges of the 21st century.
For the three “new” states in the Caspian, particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, hydrocarbon reserves in the Sea are vital for their economic growth
and future development (and ultimately long-term
survival). All three have considerable hydrocarbon reserves and hope to become major players on the world
energy market. Furthermore, their extensive hydrocarbon reserves have stimulated a lot of international
interest and increased the presence of external actors
in the Caspian region. However, even if they increase
the production of hydrocarbons, they still face several enduring obstacles: the difficulty of transporting
products from the remote, landlocked Caspian region
to lucrative international markets and the unclarified
legal status of the Sea. The lack of clarity about the
Sea’s legal status and the type of legal regime that
should govern the maritime space represents the biggest impediment to stability in the region, creating
uncertainty and political disagreement among states.
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There is a need to encourage prompt resolution of the
protracted dispute, although Iran is unlikely to agree
to anything until it has fully explored its sector of
the Sea, which may (or may not) contain significant
quantities of oil and gas. As discussed earlier, the continuing lack of consensus between the Caspian Five
about the Sea’s legal status impacts upon maritime
navigation, environmental protection, development
of hydrocarbon potential, and the construction of
new pipelines.
The Caspian littoral states have long recognized
the need to develop infrastructure to transport their
resources to international markets without relying
on any one country, leading to investment in new
pipelines such as the BTC, as well as the KCTS. But
these projects have been fraught with geopolitical
significance and have irritated Russia, who has been
bypassed. This has eroded its influence over pipelines
and export infrastructure in the Caspian Basin over
the past decade, which has had both an economic and
political impact: Moscow has lost out on revenue from
transit tariffs, but has also seen its political dominance
undermined. Nevertheless, the United States and its
allies should continue to encourage the development
of hydrocarbon transit infrastructure that circumvents
Russian territory—Moscow already has far too much
influence over oil and gas exports from the region,
undermining the political and economic autonomy of
states, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. While
these two states have so far managed to balance successfully their relations with Moscow and the West,
their growing economic might will attract greater
regional and international interest. They will need to
upgrade their naval capabilities to be able to protect
their economic interests and sea lines of communica-
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tion in the Caspian and demonstrate intent. By contrast, Russia and Iran appear to be seeking to use their
expanding naval capabilities to maintain the status
quo in the Caspian Sea region, which is to their own
advantage, and deter other littoral states from developing effective relationships with external actors. This
desire to limit the influence and presence of external
actors, especially the United States, and ensure their
own dominance in the region undermines the sovereignty of the other littoral states and their ability to
pursue an autonomous foreign policy. This desire also
has significant implications for states outside the region, such as the United States, who wish to deepen
their engagement with, and influence on, the Caspian
states. Russian-Iranian relations in the Caspian Sea region will likely provide an indicator of the direction
of broader relations between the two and should be
monitored, since their burgeoning cooperation currently is being developed merely for mutual convenience, the establishment of a strategic partnership
or alliance could be detrimental for U.S. influence in
the future.
Despite bilateral cooperation, the Caspian Five
have so far failed to establish any effective form of collective security system, and the region’s security architecture is very weak. There have been some attempts
to establish multilateral cooperation, but little has
been achieved other than political declarations. The
United States should encourage the development of
some form of regional security system in the Caspian
Sea area, to ensure that the littoral states take responsibility for regional security without the involvement
of external actors. A collective security arrangement
involving all five littoral states would also hinder any
one regional state from becoming too dominant. The
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development of scientific, technical, and academic
links with the region should be fostered, particularly
in the areas of maritime environmental protection, the
mitigation and management of oil spills and fisheries
management.
The Caspian region is part of Russia’s “southern
underbelly,” a term that underscores the sense of vulnerability it feels along its southern border—an area
that is vital for Russian national security—both in
terms of its natural resources and as a source of an
array of security challenges. Moscow considers the
broader Caspian region to be a sphere of its exclusive influence and has sought to counterbalance the
growing involvement of other actors in the region,
which has led to rising tension between Russia and
its southern neighbors. While it is concerned about
nontraditional security threats, Russia is also seeking
to remain the predominant power in the Caspian Sea
region. The upgrade of the Flotilla’s capabilities is a
visible signal of intent that Russia is unwilling to cede
any further influence and intends to remain the predominant power in the Caspian Sea region.
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